



Secure wireless access in a mobile world

Giuseppe “Gippa” Paternò
Senior Solution Architect and Security Evangelist
Visiting Researcher
Trinity College Dublin



Fàilte
(welcome)



Who am I

- Visiting Researcher at Trinity College Dublin
- Currently Solution Architect and EMEA Security Expert at a premier software company
- Previously Security Solution Architect in Sun and also in IBM
- Certifications: RHCA, RHCDS, RHCSS, CCNP/CCNA, Nortel, Array Networks and Cyberoam
- Part of the italian security community *sikurezza.org*
- Published books and whitepapers
- Forensic analysis for local govts
- More on:
 - <http://www.scss.tcd.ie/Giuseppe.Paterno/>
 - <http://www.gpaterno.com/>
 - <http://www.linkedin.com/in/gpaterno>





New devices

- We are facing the increasing number of mobile devices that are getting more and more popular:
 - Smartphones based on Windows Mobile
 - Apple iPhone
 - Netbooks (Linux/Windows)
- We're more and more connected (“always on”):
 - UMTS/HSDPA (3g, 3.5g), Wi-Fi and Wi-Max (4g)
- More and more users are requesting access to corporate data through these new devices



New security challenges

- Integrating the mobile devices into our company:
 - Accessing Groupware/PIM systems (Exchange, ...)
 - Accessing database systems
 - Accessing web services
 - Integration with geo-localization services
- New services and new “always on” needs
- Ensure data security:
 - Intentional or unintentional loss, es: theft organized by competitors or a simple loss.
 - Issues on users' privacy



... old problems

- Default configurations
- No perception of end-user about data privacy
 - End-users usually “trusts” technical stuffs
- Companies pays low/no attention to security
 - The usual sentence is: “it have to work, we'll implement security later”
- Attacks are getting more and more sophisticated
- Minimum security not implemented:
 - Do you keep your home door unlocked?



Type of attacks

- Radio attacks:
 - WEP and some WPA networks (based on TKIP) are insecure by design. Attackers can avoid cryptography easily.
 - Radio Jamming (Denial of Service).
 - Fake Access Point injected to capture users' data.
- Corporate/internal network
 - Traditional attacks (exploits/XSS) to access corporate data
- Wireless clients
 - Misuse of clients (PDAs, netbooks, laptops) as a “bridge” to the internal network.



WPA issues

- We all know about WEP issues and the solution was WPA
- Some ethical hackers demonstrated the relationship between some providers' ESSID and the WPA default key
 - Some Italians and foreign providers give the end user a Wi-Fi router with the ADSL/voice subscription. It is possible to guess the WPA key (research of Muris Kurgaš)
 - In some router it is not even possible to change the WPA PSK (Pre-Shared Key, i.e. the password)



WPA issues

- Packet decode is possible if TKIP is used in WPA
 - Issue discovered in November 2008
 - The same type of attack is used in WEP: TKIP is a temporary WEP key that is changed every 3600 seconds (as default)
- Although WPA exists also with an AES encryption back-end (WPA2), how long will it last before another research “break” it?
- In an **enterprise** scenario, always use “*WPA Enterprise*”
 - Leverage RADIUS (see my previous research on OTP)
 - Key is generated **random**



Session Sniffing

(Untitled) - Wireshark

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Help

Filter: (ip.addr eq 192.168.51.121 and ip.addr eq 213.92.5.60) + Expression... Clear Apply

Destination	Protocol	Info
192.168.51.121	TCP	pop3 > 57099 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=0 M
213.92.5.60	TCP	57099 > pop3 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0
192.168.51.121	POP	Response: +0K ifm-pop (version 5.0.0) at slim-2c star
213.92.5.60	TCP	57099 > pop3 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=51 Win=5840 Len=0
213.92.5.60	POP	Request: user gpaterno
192.168.51.121	POP	Response: +0K Password required for gpaterno.
213.92.5.60	TCP	57099 > pop3 [ACK] Seq=16 Ack=88 Win=5840 Len=0
213.92.5.60	POP	Request: pa ss prova

0000 00 03 52 01 95 8f 00 21 5d 71 7b ba 08 00 45 10 ..R....!]q{...E.
0010 00 34 d3 56 40 00 40 06 98 a3 c0 a8 33 79 d5 5c .4.V@_@...:j\ \n
0020 05 3c df 0b 00 6e 32 97 fd f5 4c 9d 6a 09 50 18 ..<...n2. ..L.j.P.
0030 16 d0 09 69 00 00 70 61 73 73 20 70 72 6f 76 61 ...i...pa ss prova
0040 0d 0a ..

File: "/tmp/etherXXXXlbaZZy" 74 ... Packets: 281 Displayed: 19 Marke... Profile: Default



SQL Server data replication

- One of the most popular database
- Widely used in a mobile world:
 - APIs makes it simple to add replication to Windows Mobile Applications
- SQL server encapsulate replication over HTTP
 - It is **very easy** to capture user data, user logins and domain information
- **Never** interconnect the replica server with Internet
 - Use a VPN and ensure that HTTPS is used



Protecting netbooks

- Netbooks should be handled like a standard laptop
- Leverage Operating Systems security feature
 - If Windows, use a firewall and antivirus
 - Hardening of the OS
 - Use central policies
- Use disk cryptography (whole disk or data only)
- Use two-factor authentication
- Do not trust wireless networks
 - Both Wi-Fi and 3G




Protecting Smartphones/PDA

- Both Windows Mobile and Apple iPhone have built-in security feature
 - Plan a wiping strategy
 - Use two-factor authentication
 - Do not trust external wireless networks (Wi-Fi and mobile operators' 3G)
 - Use cryptography in both internal and external storage, ex: Secure Digital (SD, microSD, ecc..)
 - Ensure that the application implement secure access to corporate data (HTTPS)



Use VPNs!





Thank you!!

Giuseppe “Gippa” Paternò
Visiting Researcher
Trinity College Dublin

paternog@cs.tcd.ie

<http://www.scss.tcd.ie/Giuseppe.Paterno/>

<http://www.gpaterno.com/>